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Abstract 
 
Counterfactual conditionals are cognitive tools that we incessantly use during 
our lives for judgments, evaluations, decisions. Counterfactuals are used for 
defining concepts as well; an instance of this is attested by the notions of 
opportunity cost and excess profit, two all-pervasive notions of economics: 
They are defined by undoing a given scenario and constructing a suitable 
counterfactual milieu. Focussing on the standard paradigm [Peasnell, 1981, 
1982; Peccati, 1987, 1990, 1991; Ohlson, 1995] and Magni’s [2000, 2001, 
2003, 2004, 2005, 2006] alternative paradigm this paper shows that the formal 
translation of the counterfactual state is not univocal and that Magni’s 
approach retains formal properties of symmetry, additive coherence, 
homeomorphism, which correspond to properties of frame-independence, 
time invariance, completeness. Two introductory studies are also presented to 
illustrate how people cope with these counterfactuals and ascertain whether 
either model is seen as more “natural”. A brief discussion of the results 
obtained is also provided. 
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1. Introduction 
Counterfactual conditionals are used by individuals in almost every 
domain of their life. The literature on counterfactuals has considerably 
increased in the recent past in various disciplines, in particular psychology, in 
social psychology [Roese and Olson, 1995a; Roese, 1997] as well as in 
cognitive psychology [Kahneman and Tversky, 1982; Kahneman and Miller, 
1986;  Harris, German and Mills, 1996; Byrne and Tasso, 1999; Byrne, 2002]. 
The role of language in shaping the counterfactual thought has also been 
investigated [Bloom, 1981, 1984; Au, 1983, 1984; Liu, 1985]; inquiries on the 
relationships between counterfactuals and causation have long since attracted 
the attention of philosophers of science [Chisholm, 1946;  Will, 1947; 
Goodman, 1947, 1983;  Popper, 1949; Kneale, 1950;  Sosa, 1975]; also, the 
ability of constructing counterfactuals is investigated in medical researches 
[Hooker, Roese and Park, 2000]. Likewise, economists do make extensive use 
of counterfactual reasoning, mostly self-unconsciously though. For example, a 
vast literature is concerned with economic and financial decisions: If it is true 
that, normatively, von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) utility theory 
maintains its charm among decision theorists and economists, in a descriptive 
approach the role of counterfactuals in decision-making processes is highly 
recognized in regret theory [Bell, 1982, 1985; Loomes and Sugden, 1982, 
1986], which is gaining ground among cognitive psychologists [Zeelenberg et 
al., 1996;  Zeelenberg and Beattie 1997; Tsiros, 1998]; implications for 
marketing are also studied [McGill, 2000; Roese, 2000]; further, the way 
counterfactuals affect economic and financial decisions is investigated 
[Lundberg and Frost, 1992;  McConnell et al., 2000; Tsiros and Mittal, 2000], 
as well as their impact on a personal domain [Landman and Manis, 1992]. 
Nevertheless, so far as I am aware, the role of counterfactual thought in the 
formulation of economic concepts has not yet been adequately recognized, let 
alone the epistemological implications on economic models [but see Sugden, 
2000, for an interpretation of economic models as counterfactual worlds; see 
also Elster, 1978] and, in general, on decision-making processes. The purpose 
of this paper is to show that counterfactuals may explain the fundamental 
features of the concepts of opportunity cost and excess profit, two important 
concepts in economics. In particular, it aims at showing that the 
counterfactualization of a scenario is not univocal.1 The paper presents both 
theoretical considerations and experimental results. The first part is theoretical 
and is devoted to showing that three interpretations of the above mentioned 
                                                 
1 See also Chisholm (1975) and Rescher (1975) on counterfactuals’ ambiguities. 
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concepts are possible: Two of them are semicounterfactuals, the third one is a 
genuine counterfactual.  The latter is the sole to be represented by a 
symmetric and additively coherent operator, which is a multiplicative 
homeomorphism. Conceptually, this represents, respectively, independence 
from framing, invariance with respect to the unit of time selected, 
completeness of the counterfactualization.  The second part of the paper is 
experimental: Two introductory studies have been conducted which seem to 
corroborate the thesis according to which the genuine counterfactual is more 
likely to be adopted by reasoners. Tentative explanations of these results are 
offered. 
 
 
2. Cost and profit 
 
“You face a choice. You must now decide whether to read this 
[article], to read something else, to think silent thoughts, or perhaps to write a 
bit for yourself. The value that you place on the most attractive of these 
several alternatives is the cost you must pay if you choose to read this [article] 
now” [Buchanan, 1969, p.vii, italics supplied]. When you calculate the benefit 
from reading this paper you must then take other available opportunities into 
account. The most valuable of these alternatives represents the cost of reading 
the paper. If you say that ‘it is not worth the cost’ you mean that alternatives 
are at your disposal which you prefer to reading this note. The idea of cost as 
an opportunity cost has been developed by Austrian economists (in particular 
Ludwig von Mises) as well as by economists of the London School of 
Economics such as Hayek, Coase, Thirlby, Shackle: 
 
The person is faced with the possibility of taking one or 
other of (at least) two courses of action, but not both. He 
considers the relative significance to him of the two 
courses of action, and finds that one course is of higher 
significance than the other. He ‘prefers’ one course to 
the other. His prospective opportunity of taking the less-
preferred course of action becomes the prospective cost 
of his taking the more preferred course. [Thirlby, 1946, 
pp. 33-34] 
 
The cost of doing anything consists of the receipts which 
could have been obtained if that particular decision had 
not been taken. When someone says that a particular 
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course of action ‘is not worth the cost’, this merely 
means that he prefers some other courses … This 
particular concept of cost would seem to be the only one 
which is of use in the solution of business problems, 
since it concentrates attention to the alternative courses 
of action which are open to the businessman. Costs will 
only be covered if he chooses, out of the various courses 
of action which seem open to him, that one which 
maximizes profit. [Coase, 1938, p. 123, as quoted in 
Buchanan, op.cit., italics supplied] 
 
In this light, cost is not money outlay but an outcome that might occur 
(ex ante analysis) or that might have occurred (ex post analysis) if the decision 
maker selected or had selected a different course of action.2 Cost  is then 
“subjective, it exists in the mind of the decision-maker and nowhere else” 
[Buchanan, op.cit., p. 43], for “outcomes cannot be matters of fact but are 
things imagined by the decision-maker. They exist in his imagination” 
[Shackle, 1961, pp. ix-x], outcomes “are figments of imagination … figments 
of the individual mind  (no matter of whether in some later actuality they shall 
be observed to have come true)” [ibidem, pp.9-10]. 
 
Thus, the concept of cost has a distinctive counterfactual 
characterization: It is the outcome the decision maker would receive (have 
received) if she undertook (had undertaken) a different course of action. One 
would be well advised to distinguish (opportunity) cost and (excess) profit in 
economics from cost and profit in accounting. In accountancy cost refers to 
expenditures and profit is given by the difference between revenues and costs. 
Suppose a firm undergoes an 80-euros expense obtaining, at the end of the 
period, total revenue receipts of 100 euros; the (accounting) cost is 80 and the 
(accounting) profit is 100−80=20. In this sense, ‘profit’ is conceptually a 
synonym of ‘return’. Conversely, in economics, cost is generated by a 
counterfactual alternative the decision maker takes as a reference point. 
Excess profit is given by the difference of accounting profit and the value of 
the counterfactual course of action. In the specific case, assuming that 15 is 
such a value, the (excess) profit will be 20−15=5. In other words, 20 is the 
benefit (measured in money value) of the course of action at hand, 15 is the 
value of the alternative course of action (the ‘lost opportunity’), the difference 
between these two gives the (excess) profit. Therefore, for an economist “to 
                                                 
2 For other notions of cost see Buchanan, op.cit. 
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cover costs and to maximize profits are essentially two ways of expressing the 
same phenomenon” [Coase, op.cit., p. 123]. Many synonyms have been 
coined to mean ‘excess profit’: ‘excess realizable profit’ [Edwards and Bell, 
1961), ‘excess income’ [Peasnell, 1982], ‘abnormal earnings’ [Ohlson, 1995], 
‘supernormal profit’ [Begg, Fischer, and Dornbusch, 1984, p.121], ‘residual 
income’ [Solomons, 1965; Peasnell, 1981, 1982] and others. The concept of 
‘Goodwill’ [Preinreich, 1936] is strictly related to that of excess profit, and 
the term ‘economic profit’ is also widespread in finance [e.g. Damodaran, 
2007, p. 42]. 
 
I will henceforth use the term ‘excess profit’, and keep the term 
‘profit’ in an accounting sense.3 
 
It is worthwhile noting that such a definition of excess profit makes 
the alternative course of action to act as a norm in the sense of Kahneman and 
Miller (1986). Cost and excess profit are but derivations of counterfactual 
alternatives or norms subjectively constructed by the evaluator. Typically, the 
concept of excess profit is educed from a comparison between the profit an 
economic agent achieves and the profit she could achieve (have achieved) if 
she undertook (had undertaken) a different course of action. 
 
Let us consider an example. Consider firm Alpha and suppose its net 
worth is 100 and its prospective rate of return for next period is 10%. Its 
prospective profit is then  
 
100· (1.1) − 100 = 0.1·100 = 10. 
 
Suppose now  that an alternative course of action is at its disposal at the return 
rate 9%. In the latter case, the firm would generate a profit of 
 
100· (1.09) − 100 = 0.09·100 = 9. 
 
The excess profit for Alpha is 10−9=1. The notion of excess profit emphasizes 
“the role of distance from an ideal or paragon as a determinant of typicality” 
[Kahneman and Miller, 1986, p. 143]. 
 
This correspondence between opportunity cost and norm is also 
reflected in economic decisions concerning investments. In this case the norm 
                                                 
3 I will use the term profit as excess profit only when the context makes it unambiguous. 
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is given by a (comparable4) alternative investment, which acts as a benchmark 
for acceptability. Suppose a decision maker faces the opportunity of 
undertaking a one-period project consisting of an initial outlay of 60 with a 
rate of return of 15%. In evaluating such an investment and in deciding 
whether to accept it or reject it the evaluator compares such a course of action 
with another course of action open to him. Suppose the investor may 
alternatively invest the same sum in a one-period project whose rate of return 
is 11%.5 Then 0.11۟۟·60=6.6 is the (opportunity) cost of undertaking  the former 
project. The net payoff generated by the project at hand (the excess profit) is 
then given by 0.15·60−0.11·60=9−6.6=2.4. In general, things may be framed 
in the following way: Let 0a  be the initial outlay of the project under 
examination, x  be the rate of return, i  be the rate of return of the 
counterfactual alternative. The investment is profitable if its excess profit is 
positive, namely if 
 
000 >− iaxa .     (1) 
Eq. (1) can be rewritten as 
 
0)1()1( 00 >+−+ iaxa .   (2) 
 
 
The left-hand member of eq. (2) is known, in financial economics, as Net 
Future Value (NFV) of the project (‘excess return’ is also used. See 
Damodaran, 2007, Young and O’Byrne, 2001). Dividing both members by 
)1( i+   we have 
 
0
)1(
)1(0
0 >+
++−
i
xaa .    (3) 
 
 
The left-hand side of  eq. (3) is called the Net Present Value (NPV) of the 
project. The net-present-value rule states that a project is profitable if its NPV 
is positive. The idea of maximizing NPV is standard in financial economics 
                                                 
4 ‘Comparable’ often means ‘equivalent-risk’. 
5 The alternative rate of return is often called, in the financial literature,  ‘opportunity cost of 
capital’, though this expression should be properly used to mean the value placed on the 
alternative course of action. 
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[see Brealey and Myers, 2000; Rao, 1992; Finnerty, 1986; Copeland and 
Weston, 1988] and traces back to Fisher (1930), whose analysis is carried out 
under assumption of certainty (see MacMinn, 2005, for the Fisher model 
under uncertainty). The idea of net present value maximization is 
commonplace in economic theory: “The firm attempts to maximize the 
present value of its net cash flow over an infinite horizon” [Abel, 1990, p. 
755]; “the net present value rule is also the basis for the neoclassical theory of 
investment … Much of the theoretical and empirical literature on the 
economics of investment deals with issues of this sort” [Dixit and Pindyck, 
1994, p. 5]. The NPV analysis is equivalent to that of Jorgensen (1963) and to 
the q theory of investment [Tobin, 1969]: “In all of this, the underlying 
principle is the basic net present value rule” [Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 5] 
and “the net present value rule is appropriate for decision making” [MacMinn, 
2005, p. 1]. The NPV of a project is then nothing but a mathematical 
transformation of the concept of excess profit. The term 0ia  in eq. (1) is the 
cost of undertaking the project, that is, the profit the investor would attain 
(would have attained) if he undertook (had undertaken) the alternative course 
of action. The latter is a yardstick with which the project at hand must be 
compared for evaluation and decision purposes. 
 
 
3. Conditionals and the concepts of cost and (excess) profit 
 
Counterfactual conditionals are interspersed in private reasoning 
during the lives of each individual, serving several functions [Roese and 
Olson, 1995b].  In the economic domain counterfactuals are one of the main 
ways economists adopt to explore the world [see Sugden, 2000].6 In 
particular, counterfactuals (and norms) are used by economists in order to 
define concepts: The notions of costs and (excess) profit make sense only if 
any judgmental comparison is involved. We can say that economists “do not 
wish to explain an outcome per se but rather the divergence between an 
outcome and some default alternative” [Roese and Olson, 1995c, p.13]. But, 
whilst norm theory suggests that individuals’  “norms are computed after the 
event rather than in advance” [Kahneman and Miller, 1986, p.136], in 
economics a norm is evoked in order to formulate the very definition of an 
economic concept. 
                                                 
6 Other important ones are regression and experiments. The latter tool, not frequently used in 
the past, is gaining increasing attention among scholars (see Hey, 1991). 
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The state of affairs (being firm Alpha) or the course of action (undertaking a 
project) does not provide any information on cost and excess profit unless it is 
accompanied by an alternative state of affairs or course of action serving as a 
benchmark.7 To this end, economists rely on both ordinary language and 
mathematics. Linguistically, cost is connected with the following 
counterfactual conditional:8 
 
If I (had) selected the alternative course of action, 
my return would be (have been) … 
(4) 
 
This conditional statement needs to be converted in mathematical symbols. It 
seems that the construction of the above counterfactual should be an easy 
task: Opportunity cost is made to coincide with the profit corresponding to the 
alternative state, and excess profit is just the difference between the profit 
released by the action selected (factual profit) and the profit released by the 
counterfactual alternative (counterfactual profit): 
 
EXCESS PROFIT = factual profit − counterfactual profit. (5) 
 
Because profit is given by the rate of return times the capital invested, excess 
profit is given by  
 
EXCESS PROFIT = factual (rate of return · capital invested) 
− counterfactual (rate of return · capital invested).
  (6) 
 
One just has now to substitute words with symbols (and then numbers) and 
the translation from ordinary language to mathematics is complete. The 
following section shows the way the factual situation can be undone is not 
unique. 
 
 
                                                 
7 With no such alternative, excess profit turns into accounting profit and cost turns into 
expenditure. 
8 I do not distinguish among prefactual, nonfactual and counterfactual conditionals. I will 
always refer to them as counterfactuals; such a distinction is quite irrelevant to my analysis 
(counterfactual interpretation is possible even in indicative mood: see Dudman, 1988). 
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4. Three counterfactual interpretations 
 
The paradigm accepted in the literature as the correct formal 
translation of the notion of excess profit comes from the financial and 
accounting literatures. The conventional approach has been forerun by 
Preinreich (1938), who states that “Capital value equals the book value, plus 
the discounted excess profits” (p. 240. See also his eq. (57)). This statement 
was then proved by Edwards and Bell (1961, chapter 2, Appendix B), who use 
the term ‘excess realizable profit’. The term ‘residual income’, widely used in 
corporate finance and management accounting, appears for the first time in 
Solomons (1965, p. 63). Important studies have been conducted by Peasnell 
(1981, 1982) and Ohlson (1989, 1995), who have triggered a renewed interest 
in this notion, which is now used for various purposes: Valuation, incentive 
compensation, capital budgeting [see Arnold and Davies, 2000; Martin and 
Petty, 2000].9 Many metrics have been generated complying with this 
approach, and many others may be in principle constructed, but the individual 
differences among these measures are immaterial to our subject, depending on 
the choice of book values as opposed to market values, and the choice of an 
equity perspective as opposed to an entity one. They all share the same 
modelling approach. The most widely known of these models is Stewart’s 
(1991) Economic Value Added (EVA).10 EVA is 
 
the leading example of a new class of metrics that attempt to 
measure an underlying concept called residual income. 
Recognized by economists since the 1770s, residual income is 
based on the premise that, in order for a firm to create wealth 
for its owners, it must earn more on its total  invested capital 
than the cost of the capital. Whereas traditional accounting net 
income measures  “profits” … residual income measures 
                                                 
9 Indipendently, Peccati (1987, 1990, 1992) has developed a model of decomposition of a 
project's NPV, which is consistent with the standard approach. 
10 EVA has been attracting increasing attention among scholars and practitioners and is 
presented in any modern finance textbook [e.g., Damodaran, 1999; Brealey and Myers, 2000, 
Fernández, 2002]. The literature on it has increased exponentially in the past fifteen years. It is 
so common that even many dictionaries report it as an entry (see, for example, the Longman 
Business English Dictionary, 2000, Pearson Educational Limited, or the Dictionary of 
Accounting Terms, 2001, Barron’s Educational Series, 3rd edition). 
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“profits” net of the … cost of … equity capital.11 (Biddle, 
Bowen and Wallace, 1999). 
 
Stewart’s EVA is currently used as a measure of projects’ periodic 
performance, as an index for evaluating firms, as a tool for forecasting asset 
prices, as a yardstick for rewarding managers. The hub of Stewart’s 
methodology is just that of calculating a periodic excess profit on the basis of 
eq. (6): A straightforward definition of EVA is 
 
EVA = Net Operating Profit After Taxes − Cost of Capital * Capital Invested 
 
The latter coincides with eq. (6),  because ‘Cost of Capital’ is the rate of 
return of an alternative course of action (the reference to Taxes  is not relevant 
to our subject). 
 
In this paper, I will pick up the term ‘EVA’ as a synecdoche for this 
group of metrics; that is, the acronym EVA will be used for denoting the set 
of all possible models that are consistent with the conventional notion of 
excess profit.   
 
In a vast array of papers, Magni (2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006) 
has shown that EVA is not the only way of interpreting the notion of excess 
profit; that is, EVA is only one possible way of using eq. (6). This claim is 
proved by providing an alternative paradigm, originally named Systemic 
Value Added (SVA) and later relabelled lost-capital paradigm [Magni, 2007], 
which conforms to eq. (6) as well. As a matter of fact, it is here shown that a 
third (admittedly, less fascinating) interpretation is possible.  
 
We will work on the following scenario and describe three alternative 
ways of coping with the corresponding counterfactual situation. 
 
Scenario 1. Firm Alpha, operating in sector A, has a net worth of 100 
yielding a 10% return each year. If firm Alpha operated in sector B its 
rate of return would be 8%. 
 
Question (a). What profit will Alpha get in the third year? 
Question (b). What profit would Alpha get in the third year if it 
operated in sector B? 
                                                 
11 The cost of equity capital is just our counterfactual profit. 
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Note that the answers to (a) and (b) are just the two terms in eq. (6), namely 
the factual profit and the counterfactual profit. 
 
4.1  Answers: Type I 
 
Question (a).  Alpha’s capital increases by an annual 10%, starting from 100. 
So, we have 
 
capital at time 0 100   
capital at time 1 110=100(1+0.1) 
capital at time 2 121=110(1+0.1). 
 
The profit in the third year is 0.1·121=12.1. 
 
Question (b). If Alpha operated in sector B, it would earn 8% on its capital, so 
the third year’s profit would be 0.08·121=9.68. 
 
4.2 Answers: Type II 
 
Question (a).  As in Type I 
Question (b). If Alpha operated in sector B, then its capital would raise by an 
annual  8% rate of return, so that 
capital at time 0 100 
capital at time 1 108=100(1+0.08) 
capital at time 2 116.64=108(1+0.08) 
 
This means that the firm would earn, in the third year, its 10% on a capital of 
116.64. The third  year’s profit would then be 0.1·116.64=11.664. 
 
4.3 Answers: Type III 
 
Question (a).  As in Type I 
 
Question (b). If Alpha operated in sector B, it would earn an annual 8% on its 
capital. The value of the latter would thus increase by 8% so that it would 
equal 116.64 at the beginning of the third year. On 116.64 the firm would earn 
an 8% so that the third year’s profit would be 0.08·116.64=9.33. 
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Type I is the standard way of formally translating eq. (6) (EVA). Type III is 
Magni’s proposal, Type II is another different way of interpreting eq. (6), not 
considered in the literature. 
 
 
5. Semicounterfactuals and genuine counterfactuals 
 
To understand the cognitive implications of the three types of 
counterfactuals and their relationships with mathematics, let us have a closer 
glance to eq. (6). It says that the excess profit depends on the factual profit 
and on a counterfactual profit. Both factual profit and counterfactual profit 
depend on the relation existing between two elements: The rate and the 
capital. Denote with a and b such elements and with * the operator linking 
them (we may read a*b as “a is applied to b”: In our case, a multiplication. 
We could rewrite eq. (6) as 
 
F(a*b) − C(a*b) 
 
where the operators F and C mean, respectively, ‘factual’ and 
‘counterfactual’. 
 
Let us focus on the counterfactual term C(a* b).  It says that we have 
to counterfactualize the situation; that is, we have to undo a scene whose 
characters are a and b. This can be accomplished in three ways. The first 
method (Type I) is to undo a and then relate it to the factual b. The second 
way (Type II) is to undo b and then relate it to the factual a. The third way 
(Type III) is to undo both a and b and then relate them. In symbols, we have 
 
Type I  C(a*b)= C(a)*F(b) 
Type II  C(a*b)= F(a)*C(b) 
Type III C(a*b)= C(a)*C(b). 
 
Type I assumes that capital in the third period is the factual one, and is 
concerned with a change in the rate of return. Type II is interested in changing 
the capital while maintaining the factual rate of return. Type III undoes both 
rate of return and capital. Type I and Type II only partially change reality 
maintaining one of the two features in the factual mode, so they deserve to be 
named semicounterfactuals (the scenario is undone ceteris paribus); Type III 
shifts from reality to a counterfactual realm where both elements are ruled out 
and replaced by their counterfactual counterparts, so it may be regarded as a 
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genuine counterfactual (the scenario is undone mutatis mutandis). Note that 
the completeness of the counterfactualization in Type III may be 
mathematically interpreted by saying that  operator C is a multiplicative 
homeomorphism in the same sense as the power operator is a 
homeomorphism with respect to the product operator: Letting N be the power 
operator we have N(ab)=N(a)N(b) (that is, ttt baab =)( for any real t). 
 
The three ways of counterfactualizing the same scenario grow out of 
different intepretations of Question (b). The three (cognitive and) 
mathematical interpretations can be linguistically represented by the following 
statements: 
 
Scenario 1 
 
Type I (undoing rate). What profit would Alpha get in the third 
year if it operated in sector B in that year ? 
 
Type II (undoing capital). What profit would Alpha get in the 
third year if it operated in sector B  up until the third year? 
 
Type III (undoing both rate and capital). What profit would 
Alpha get in the third year if it operated in sector B each year? 
 
or, equivalently, 
 
Scenario 1 
 
Type I (undoing rate). What profit would Alpha get in the third 
year if in that year its rate of return were that of a sector B’s 
firm? 
 
Type II (undoing capital). What profit would Alpha get in the 
third year if in that year its capital were that of a sector B’s 
firm? 
 
Type III (undoing both rate and capital). What profit would 
Alpha get in the third year if it earned each year like a sector 
B’s firm? 
 
 14
The existence of Type I, Type II, and Type III shows that it is not obvious 
how the scenario should be undone in constructing counterfactual alternatives. 
Type I is implicitly regarded, in the financial literature as the only possible 
interpretation and thus the correct interpretation of eq. (6). In fact, Type I is 
only one of three possible interpretations of the counterfactual alternative and 
I have characterized it as a semicounterfactual way of looking at what might 
be (have been). Moving from ordinary language to mathematics, one can say 
that for the undoing of the scenario to be complete (genuine) one needs an 
operator which is a homeomorphism with respect to the operator linking a and 
b (i.e., the operator *). 
 
In the next sections it will be shown that, though seemingly 
legitimate, Type I and Type II reveal some oddities.12  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
12 Scenario 1 is only a particular case of a more general pattern of situations where the 
counterfactual state of affairs is not unambiguous. The following scenario is an equivalent 
(noneconomic) example of how counterfactual situations may have multiple interpretations. 
 
Scenario 2. Naima is a Swedish six-year-old child. She is 100 cm tall. For 
the next years (say, five), she is expected to grow in stature at a rate of 10% 
a year. If she were Italian,  the increase rate would be 8% a year. 
 
Question (a). What increase in stature will Naima have in her 9th year? 
Question (b). What increase in stature would Naima have in her 9th year if she were 
Italian? 
 
In Scenario 2 a child named Naima replaces firm Alpha of Scenario 1, and the notions of 
‘stature’ and ‘increase rate’ replace the notions of ‘capital’ and ‘rate of return’, respectively, but 
the cognitive framework is identical. The corresponding linguistic representations are: 
 
Type I (undoing increase rate). What increase in stature would Naima have 
in her 9th year if in that year her increase rate were that of an Italian child? 
 
Type II (undoing stature). What increase in stature would  Naima have in her 
9th year if in that year her stature were that of an Italian child? 
 
Type III (undoing both increase rate and stature). What increase in stature 
would Naima have in her 9th year if she grew each year like an Italian child? 
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6. Summing excess profits 
 
If one assumes that a semicounterfactual interpretation is acceptable, 
one encounters some oddities I now focus on. But first, suppose we were to 
compute the whole factual profit earned by firm Alpha in the span of three 
periods. We can tackle the task in two ways: One way is to directly compute 
the whole profit as the difference between Alpha’s net worth after three years 
and its net worth at the outset. At the outset, net worth is 100; at the end of the 
period it is 100(1.1)3=133.1 (the initial net worth plus all annual profits), so 
the whole profit is 133.1−100=33.1. The second way is to explicitly sum the 
annual profits: They are, respectively,  
 
first year’s profit = 0.1*100 = 10 
second year’s profit = 0.1*110 = 11 
third year’s profit = 0.1*121 = 12.1. 
 
Summing the threes shares, one finds back 10+11+12.1=33.1. Let us now 
focus on the counterfactual case and suppose we want to calculate the whole 
counterfactual profit (i.e., the whole profit generated in the span of three 
periods by the counterfactual scenario). I now show that the coincidence just 
found for the factual profit keeps valid for the counterfactual profit only if 
Type III is adopted. Indeed, if one computes the whole counterfactual profit 
directly, one obtains  100(1.08)3−100=25.9712, irrespective of which 
interpretation of excess profit we rest on. We would expect that the latter be 
found as a sum of the periodic counterfactual profits as well. Strangely 
enough, this is not the case for Type I and Type II. We have 
 
year Type I C(a)*F(b) 
Type II 
F(a)*C(b) 
Type III 
C(a)*C(b) 
1st  0.08*100=8 0.1*100=10 0.08*100=8 
2nd  0.08*110=8.8 0.1*108=10.8 0.08*108=8.64 
3rd 0.08*121=9.68 0.1*116.64=11.664 0.08*116.64=9.3312 
 
 
If one sums the three shares one finds 
 
8+8.8+9.68 = 26.48 ≠ 25.9712 
for Type I, 
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10+10.8+11.664 = 32.464 ≠ 25.9712 
for Type II, and 
 
8+8.64+9.3312 = 25.9712 
 
for Type III. The whimsical results of Type I and Type II tell us something 
about the way the scenario is counterfactualized. In particular, let P be the 
whole profit (factual or counterfactual) and Ps the s-th year profit (factual or 
counterfactual), then ∑ == 3 1s sPP   is the whole profit. Denoting with F(P) 
the whole factual profit and with C(P) the whole counterfactual profit, one 
finds that the operator F is additively coherent: 
∑
=
=
3
1
)(F)(F
s
sPP  
whereas the operator C is (additively) noncoherent for Type I and II and 
coherent for Type III. That is, only for the latter we have: 
∑
=
=
3
1
)(C)(C
s
sPP . 
The noncoherence means that there is a cognitive discrepancy between the 
way in which the scenario is undone for the whole length of time and the way 
in which the scenario is undone period by period. To put it differently, 
consider our firm whose capital is 100 at time 0 and assume that the capital 
becomes 125.9712 after one period, if the counterfactual course of action is 
employed. The excess profit is evidently 25.9712. Now, take the third part of 
this period as unit of time and consider an 8% per period return. Type III is 
invariant with respect to this change, that is calculating the three excess 
profits and summing one gets to 25.9712; In other terms, it is irrelevant which 
unit of time one uses for computing excess profit. Unlike Type III, Type I and 
Type II are not invariant with respect to the unit of time selected, since the 
excess profit calculated with the new unit of time differs from the previous 
one.  
 
Additive coherence for a residual income measure is equivalent to the 
so-called property of earning aggregation in management accounting (see 
Penman, 1992, for the importance of such a property. See also Ohlson, 1995). 
In Type III, the total residual incomes aggregated lead to the Net Future 
Value, irrespective of the value of each individual excess profit. 
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7. Symmetry 
 
In the previous example normality was predetermined, that is the 
reference point was explicitly stated. We will now turn to a decision-making 
process where the reference point depends on the way a scenario is depicted 
and will apply the three approaches to it. 
 
Consider the two following ways of describing the same scenario: 
 
Scenario 3.1. Roberta faces the opportunity of investing 100 
in project A, whose annual rate of return is 10%. Alternatively, 
she can invest the same amount in project B yielding an annual 
8%. 
 
Question (a). Suppose Roberta chooses A: What is the profit in the third 
period? 
Question (b). What would the profit be in the same period, should Roberta 
choose B? 
 
 
Scenario 3.2. Roberta faces the opportunity of investing 100 
in project B, whose annual rate of return is 8%. Alternatively, 
she can invest the same amount in project A yielding an annual 
10%. 
 
Question (a). Suppose Roberta chooses B: What is the profit in the third 
period? 
Question (b). What would the profit be in the same period, should Roberta 
choose A? 
 
 
Table 1 collects the answers for each Type of counterfactual. 
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Table 1. Two frames for Scenario 3 
 
Scenario Question Type I Type II Type III 
3.1 (a) (b) 
(0.10)(121.00) 
(0.08)(121.00) 
(0.10)(121.00) 
(0.10)(116.64) 
(0.10)(121.00) 
(0.08)(116.64) 
3.2 (a) (b) 
(0.08)(116.64) 
(0.10)(116.64) 
(0.08)(116.64) 
(0.08)(121.00) 
(0.08)(116.64) 
(0.10)(121.00) 
 
 
Note that Scenario 3.1 and Scenario 3.2 are just the same scenario but the 
framing is changed. In the former description B acts as the reference point and 
A is the project under consideration, in the latter the role is reversed. So the 
factual (counterfactual) course of action in Scenario 3.1 turns to be the 
counterfactual (factual) alternative in Scenario 3.2. Therefore, questions (a) 
and (b) in 3.1 are, respectively, questions (b) and (a) in 3.2. The symmetry of 
the situation is well reflected in Type III, where the factual (counterfactual) 
profit of 3.1 coincides with the counterfactual (factual) profit of 3.2. 
Conversely, Types I and II are asymmetric and as Table 1 shows, there is a 
sort of  duality between either Type: Type I’s counterfactual alternative of 3.1 
(3.2) is just Type II’s counterfactual alternative of 3.2 (3.1). So Types I and II 
are whimsical ways of undoing scenarios since, if adopted, they lead to 
different evaluations of the same situation. In terms of excess profit, this 
means that while Type III keeps the same excess profit (in absolute value) 
regardless of the way the decision process is represented (look at the 
symmetry of the last column of the table), each of the other ones leads to two 
excess profits differing in absolute value. Adopting Types I and II our Roberta 
would compute different excess profits depending on how she describes the 
decision process. 13 
 
This awkward result seems to suggest that advocates of Type I and 
Type II should suffer from  a frame-dependent cognitive illusion [Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981; Kahneman and Tversky, 1984]. Types I and II seem 
therefore to be examples of counterfactuals which “leave people subject to 
biases and to errors of judgement” [Sherman and McConnell, 1995, p. 203]. 
 
                                                 
13 Another relevant situation where the point of reference is not predetermined regards two 
firms or two business units, whose performance is measured by comparison with the other 
one’s performance. 
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8 . Study 1 
 
The purpose of this study was to determine which one among Types I, 
II and III is the more natural way of thinking of cost and (excess) profit and 
therefore to determine whether or not people adhere to the standard definition 
as given in the financial literature. 
 
Participants The sample was composed by 104 Italian second-year students  
of the Faculty of Economics of the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia. 
Fourty-three  (41%) students were female and 61 (59%) were male, with a 
mean age of 21, ranging from  20  to 28. They all had previously attended a 
first course in economics and in accounting. The subjects participated in 
partial fulfilment of financial calculus course requirements. Forty-four out of 
the 104 students had been exposed, during the course, to Stewart’s  model, 
that is to Type I interpretation. The remaining 60 had had no exposure to Type 
I interpretation. No one had had any exposure to Type III interpretation 
(Magni’s model) nor to Type II. 
 
Procedure Each subject received Scenario 1 in my presence. The task was 
administered in the classroom. Participants have been given 25 minutes to 
complete the task but all of them finished within 15 minutes. Any answer was 
assigned to one of the three types on the basis of the solutions shown in 
Section 4. Any other different answer (included incomplete or inconsistent 
solutions) has been classified as undefined.14 
 
Results Results are collected in Table 2 (percentages have been rounded). I 
expected that exposed students would show a greater inclination to engage in 
a Type I interpretation. Contrary to expectations, the percentage of subjects 
giving a Type III intepretation is very high for both nonexposed and exposed 
students. In particular, the latter show a very high percentage of genuine-
counterfactual interpretation (84%). It seems that individuals do not find the 
standard notions of cost and excess profit as the natural ones. They seem to 
find Type III approach more appropriate as a definition of excess profit (so 
doing, they prevent themselves to be hidden in the cognitive trap we have 
                                                 
14 Two students previously exposed to Stewart’s model provided both Type I and Type III 
solutions: Their answers have been classified as undefined. 
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seen in section 7). Note that Type II has been completely neglected by 
students. 
 
 
Table 2. Cognitive interpretation of Scenario 2 
Sample  
 
Response rate (number) 
 
  Type I  
Type 
II 
 
Type III 
 
Undefined 
  
Exposed students  5% (2) 0% (0) 84% (37) 11% (5)  
Nonexposed students  2% (1) 0% (0) 93% (56) 5% (3)  
       
 
 
9. Study 2 
 
This experiment deals with a situation where an economic agent 
undertakes an investment consisting of withdrawing 100 from a current 
account and reinvesting two cash flows at time 1 and 2 respectively in the 
same account. The scenario is just a little more complex than Scenario 1 and 
the norm is given by the current account. The purpose is that of determining 
whether raising the degree of difficulty of the task encourages a change in the 
way individuals cognize the concepts of cost and profit. 
 
The scenario is the following: 
 
Scenario 4. A decision maker’s wealth amounts to 100, which 
is invested in a current account A yielding an annual rate of 
return of i=10%. She faces the opportunity of undertaking the 
following investment: Withdrawal of 40 from account A and 
investment of that sum on a current account B yielding an 
annual rate of return of x=15%; from B she will withdraw, 
after one year and two years, the sums 26 and 23 respectively. 
The sums will be immediately reinvested in account A. 
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Suppose now the decision maker has undertaken investment B. 
 
Question (a). What is the profit in the second year? 
Question (b). What would the profit have been in the second 
year if the investment had not been undertaken? 
 
The solutions are given in the Appendix. 
 
Participants The sample was composed by 112 Italian second-year students 
of the Faculty of Economics of the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia. 
Fifty-three (47%) students were female and 59 (53%) were male, with a mean 
age of 21, ranging from  19  to 23. They all  had previously attended a first 
course in economics and in accounting. They  participated in partial fulfilment 
of financial calculus course requirements. Eighty-one students out of the 112 
had been taught Stewart’s  model, that is Type I interpretation. The remaining 
31 had had no exposure to Type I interpretation. No one of the students had 
had exposure to Type III interpretation (Magni’s model) nor to Type II. The 
participants to this experiments have not participated to Experiment 1. 
 
Procedure Each subject received Scenario 4 in my presence. The task was 
administered in the classroom. Subjects have been given 70 minutes to 
complete the task but most of them finished within 50 minutes. Any answer 
was assigned to one of the types on the basis of the solutions given in the 
Appendix. Any other solution (included incomplete or inconsistent solutions) 
has been classified as undefined. 
 
Results Results are shown in Table 3 (percentages have been rounded). They 
mirror the results found for Scenario 1. A more complex milieu does not 
change the way cost and (excess) profit are cognized by individuals. A higher 
percentage of undefined answers is to be ascribed to a high number of 
incomplete or incorrect solutions, owing to the higher degree of difficulty of 
the task. Even exposed students keep on undoing scenarios in a genuinely 
counterfactual way (73%): They cleave to Type III even though the 
knowledge of the EVA model should encourage a standard interpretation. 
Overall, ruling out the undefined answers, we see that  94% of 
exposed students (95% in Scenario 1) cleave to Type III interpretation. Type 
II is totally neglected, as it was in Scenario 1. 
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Table 3. Cognitive interpretation of Scenario 4 
            
Sample 
 
Response rate (number) 
 
 Type I  
Type II 
 
Type II 
 
Undefined 
  
Exposed students 5% (4) 0% (0) 73% (59) 22% (18)  
Nonexposed 
students 0% (0) 0% (0) 68% (21) 32% (10)  
      
 
 
10. Discussion 
 
The way Scenarios 1 and 4 have been undone by the subjects tested is 
radically different from the way financial economists are accustomed to undo 
the same scenarios in order to provide the notions of cost and excess profit. 
As we have seen, there are three possible ways of altering the scenarios. 
Financial economists focus on the rate of return and render the capital an 
immutable component. According to this view (Type I), the piece of 
information conveyed relates to what might occur (have occurred) if the rate 
of return were (had been) different from the factual one while maintaining the 
capital in the factual mode. Financial economists iterate this reasoning for 
each period, that is they focus on a single period forgetting the events of the 
preceding periods (viz., forgetting that if the firm invested in the alternative 
business/sector, in the preceding years the rate of return would be different 
and thus the value of the capital would be different). Conversely, the subjects 
tested seem to focus on the entire wealth of the economic agent and its 
evolution through time. They take into account the whole story: If the firm 
invested in the alternative business, its capital would be different at each time, 
so the features to be mutated are both the rate of return and the capital. 
 
It is not easy to ascertain the reasons why financial economists prefer 
Type I interpretation. They seem to construct a cognitive representation where 
different courses of action are associated to different rates of return but not to 
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different capitals. At each period the capital is maintained in the factual mode 
and  the rate is altered to the counterfactual mode. When interpreting the 
question 
 
What profit would Alpha get in the third year if it operated in sector B? 
 
reasoners have to retrieve the following cognitive representation: 
 
RATE*CAPITAL. 
 
Financial economists focus on the first factor, whereas other people seem to 
focus on both factors. Linguistically, this means that the antecedent 
 
if it operated in sector B 
 
is intended as referred only to one year (the third year in our case) by financial 
economists, to the entire span by individuals. In this sense, we could say that 
financial economists focus their attention on the period rather than on the 
whole duration of the course of action. The reason might lie in the higher 
degree of mutability of a controllable event [Girotto et al., 1991]. Financial 
economists seem to find it easier to think of an alteration of the rate rather 
than a change in capital, which is perhaps regarded as an uncontrollable 
feature of the scenario, and, as a result, less mutable than the rate of return. 
But why then is capital regarded as an uncontrollable feature? It might be that 
financial economists, contrary to what is currently thought, are not concerned 
with what the decision maker’s profit would be if she undertook a different 
course of action, but with what the profit of a different agent would be if she 
held the same (factual) capital of the decision maker. If so, they are not 
comparing the decision maker’s profit to the profit that same decision maker 
would earn if she undertook another course of action; instead, they are 
comparing the decision maker’s profit to the profit of some other agent 
owning the same capital as the decision maker’s. In other terms, their decision 
maker does not seem to translate a counterfactual conditional such as “If I 
selected the counterfactual course of action, then my return would be ...”, but, 
rather, a counterfactual such as “If an agent different from myself held my 
capital and selected a course of action corresponding to my counterfactual 
course of action, then her return would be...”. At any rate, it seems that people 
are reluctant to engage in such interpretation. They seem to have a broader 
perspective, they defocus the situation while undoing the scenario, and mutate 
both features, rate and capital. People do associate alternative courses of 
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action with alternative rates of return, but they also take into consideration 
that the choice of a specific alternative made at the outset determines a 
specific evolution of capital. At time 0 the same capital can be invested at 
either rate of return, but once decision has been  made the value of capital will 
evolve accordingly, so that at each period the counterfactual rate of return 
must be applied to a counterfactual capital in order to accomplish the 
counterfactualization. If the firm invested in the alternative sector, it would 
not only invest net worth at the annual 8%, but also that rate would be applied 
to a capital which would increase by an annual 8% (not an annual 10%).  In 
terms of mental model theory [Johnson-Laird, 1983], this amounts to saying 
that financial economists’ mental model of the counterfactual state may be 
represented as 
 
 
    COUNTERFACTUAL RATE  FACTUAL CAPITAL15 
 
whereas our subjects’ mental model retrieve a pure counterfactual state: 
 
 
   COUNTERFACTUAL RATE COUNTERFACTUAL CAPITAL. 
 
No one seems to be interested in Type II interpretation, though it is specular 
to Type I. As for financial economists, the reason lies in the fact that capital is 
seen as immutable since it bears no relation to alternative courses of action; as 
for ordinary people, they have a broader view, as we have seen, and the 
modification of one single element alone is unacceptable: The whole story 
must be changed. 
It might  be that linguistic shaping plays a role in the way individuals 
undo such kinds of scenarios, and further researches could be addressed to 
gradually manipulating the linguistic description of a particular situation, so 
as to analyze to what extent  the cognitive interpretation changes from one 
Type to another. As noted, economists have both language and mathematics 
to express notions and concepts. Could language (and the way language is 
used) affect thought in some specific  cases? Could it be that a particular 
mental representation is elicited by a specific linguistic representation of a 
situation? The experiments conducted suggest that people cognize the notion 
of opportunity cost so that all elements are changed. But to become a financial 
                                                 
15 A genuine-counterfactual reasoner would say that that of economists “is an attempt 
to pull counterfactual rabbits out of actual hats” [Elster, 1978, p. 203]. 
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economist implies to master a new discipline. So, whenever ordinary people 
learn to become financial economists, they have to change their own cognitive 
schemas in order to adopt the conventional one accepted in finance. In all this, 
language could play a role: 
 
Learning a new discipline largely consists in coming to 
understand and use appropriately the individual labelled 
schemas that constitute its fundamental vocabulary. Labelled 
schemas … play active roles in the way we categorize the …  
world and hence in the way we construct our attitudes to it. 
[Bloom, 1981, p. 72] 
 
It would be interesting to test scholars and see whether different linguistic 
labels and different representations of the same scenarios generate different 
notions of cost and excess profit. 
 
 
11. Concluding remarks 
 
This paper deals with modelling cost and excess profit, also known as 
residual income. The aims of this paper are: (i) To show that these 
fundamental economic concepts are based on implicit counterfactual 
reasoning; (ii) to show that the formalization of these counterfactual 
conditionals is not univocal; (iii) to show that ordinary people may interpret 
such counterfactuals in a different way from academics, who have created 
those implicit counterfactuals. 
 
In general, there seems to be no awareness that counterfactuals crowd 
economic notions (their use is mainly implicit). There are exceptions, as is the 
case of historical economics, where the notion of counterfactual is self-
consciously used [see Fogel, 1964; Fogel and Engerman, 1974; Thomas, 
1965], though currently cliometrics seems to have lost its appeal among 
scholars. Theory of games is sometimes viewed as an inquiry into 
counterfactuals [Selten and Leopold, 1982; Stalnaker, 1996]. However, the 
most noticeable attempt to view economic laws as counterfactual statements is 
found in Hülsmann [2003]: “a whole class of economic laws are 
counterfactual laws. They concern the relationship  between what human 
beings actually do …  and what they could have done instead” (p. 57). So, 
“self-aware or not, economists will go on speaking counterfactually about 
noncooperative games, macroeconomic policy, and the retrospective welfare 
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calculations of historical economics” [McCloskey, 1987]. Nor do scholars 
focus their attention on the relationships between such counterfactuals and 
their mathematical translation. This paper aims at eliciting interest in 
investigating the circumstances in which scholars make use of counterfactuals 
for defining concepts, identifying the implications for theoretical models (and 
for decision-making as well), and, in contrast, how ordinary people cognize 
the same situation and which mental model they are prone to activate.16 Using 
counterfactuals is a major strategy for defining concepts but there is no unique 
way to undo a scenario, both in linguistic and in formal terms. In particular, 
we have counterfactual statements lending themselves to different cognitive 
representations and thus different mathematical formalizations. The three 
representations we have seen are but three different ways of defining the 
concepts of opportunity cost and excess profit, and provide different 
information. Type I is the standard way of formally translating the concept of 
cost, Type III is a model introduced by Magni (2000, 2001, 2003, 2005, 
2006), Type II has never been considered in the literature. We have seen that 
only Type III interpretation presupposes that the counterfactual operator is a 
multiplicative homeomorphism with the properties of symmetry and additive 
coherence. These three properties correspond to three cognitive categories: 
The former is the mathematical correspondent of what I have named genuine 
counterfactual, a counterfactual where the reasoner alters all of the features, as 
opposed to the semicounterfactual undoing, which involves a partial mutation 
of the scenario. Symmetry has to do with framing. A definition of excess 
profit should be symmetric, that is, taking either alternative as a reference 
point should not result in a change of (the absolute value of) profit (Type I 
and Type II are asymmetric: The reasoner cognizes the situation so that excess 
profit changes depending on which of the alternatives is taken as the 
benchmark). Additive coherence guarantees coherence in the calculation of 
the whole counterfactual profit: It can be deduced from a difference between 
counterfactual terminal net worth and initial net worth, as well as from the 
sum of all periodic counterfactual profits. Type I-reasoners are trapped in a 
paradox: The sum of the parts do not equal the whole, which is tantamount to 
saying that their counterfactual is not invariant with respect to changes in the 
unit of time. 
 
                                                 
16 Byrne and Tasso (1999) and Thompson and Byrne (2002) show that individual 
differences lead to differences in interpretations of subjunctives. In our case the 
individual differences would refer not to preconstructed counterfactuals but to the 
very way a counterfactual is constructed by the reasoner. 
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Experimentally, two introductory studies have been conducted among 
Italian students of the University of Modena and Reggio Emilia. The studies 
seem to corroborate the tentative thesis according to which nonacademic 
reasoners lean toward a complete counterfactualization of the scenario. 
Individuals seem to prefer to genuinely undo scenarios than focus on the 
alteration of the rate of return alone. Fruitful experiments may be conducted 
to pinpoint the relations among language, mathematics and reasoners’ mental 
models. Moreover, it is worth studying the differences, if any, between a 
concept of cost generated by a prefactual (decision has not been taken) or by a 
nonfactual (decision has already been taken), as well as understanding 
whether any significant divergence originates from an ex ante analysis (action 
has not yet begun) as opposed to an ex post analysis (action is over). 
Furthermore, it would theoretically and practically helpful to single out 
situations where either model is more appropriate. For example, if a 
methodology for rewarding managers is to be modelled on the basis of excess 
profit, Magni’s model may be more suitable in a situation where a business 
unit’s performance is set against another business unit’s performance, given 
that this model fulfils the property of symmetry. The standard model, of 
which Stewart’s EVA is an instantiation, may be more appropriate in a 
situation where managers of a firm often change, possibly period by period: In 
this case the new manager should be considered as starting at the outset with a 
determined capital equal to the capital left by the preceding period’s manager. 
Given that the two models may even lead to different signs [Ghiselli Ricci and 
Magni, 2006], the choice of the model may also depend on several other 
aspects (i.e., the piece of information one is willing to retrieve from the notion 
of excess profit, the degree at which a model motivates managers, the degree 
at which either model affects managers’ compensation and therefore outflows 
from the firm etc.). 
 
It is worth noting that the present work suggests a well-determined 
epistemological perspective: If the notion of opportunity cost is subjective, if 
multiple interpretations are possible, and if either model may be more suitable 
depending on the situation and on several qualitative and quantitative 
considerations, then a conventionalist view might be inferred, in the sense of 
Poincaré (1902). In this sense, opportunity cost is just a matter of convention, 
and the widespread adoption of the standard model in the financial literature is 
just an agreed upon convention (this aspect pertains to the sociological side of 
the issue as well as the epistemological side). 
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Appendix 
 
Solutions to Scenario 4. 
 
Type I 
Question (a). The value of account B after one year has increased at a rate of 
15% but has decreased by the sum 26, so the value is 20=40(1+0.15)−26. 
Accordingly, the profit in the second year is 0.15·20=3. 
Question (b). The counterfactual is here interpreted as 
 
What would the profit have been in the second year if in that 
year the investment had not been undertaken? 
 
In this case, the value of 20 just mentioned would have been placed in account 
A generating a 10% return. As a result, the profit would have been 0.1·20=2. 
 
Type II 
Question (a). As in Type I 
Question (b). The counterfactual is here interpreted as 
 
What would the profit have been in the second year if up until 
then the investment had not been undertaken? 
 
In this situation account A’s value after one year would have been different: 
In fact, the sum 40 would have remained in account A, yielding a 10% return, 
which means a total value of 44=40(1+0.1); also, no 26 would have been 
reinvested in account B. So, after one year account A’s value would have 
been greater (with respect to the factual case)  by 44 and smaller by 26, which 
results in a surplus of 44−26=18. But if the investor had had a surplus of 18 in 
account A he would have invested it in account B at the beginning of the 
second year, earning a 15% return. Therefore, the profit in the second year 
would have been 0.15·18=2.7. 
 
Type III 
Question (a). As in Type I 
Question (b). The counterfactual is here interpreted as 
 
What would the profit have been if the investment had never been 
undertaken? 
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In this case, account A’s value after one year would have been different: In 
fact, the sum 40 would have remained in account A, yielding a 10% return, 
which means a total value of 44=40(1+0.1); also, no 26 would have been 
reinvested in account A. So, after one year account A’s value would have 
been greater (with respect to the factual case)  by 44 and smaller by 26, which 
results in a surplus of 44−26=18. Therefore, in the second year our decision 
maker would have earned a 10% return on that 18: Hence, the counterfactual 
profit 0.1·18=1.8. 
 
An alternative solution is possible for Type III: 
 
Question (a). After one year, account B’s value is 20=40(1+0.15)−26, while 
account A’s value is 92=60(1+0.1)+26. The second year’s profit on A is 
0.1·92=9.2, the second year’s profit on B is 0.15·20=3, so 9.2+3=12.2 is the 
profit in the second year. 
Question (b). Account A’s value after one year would have been 
110=100(1+0.1), so the profit in the second year would have been 
0.1·110=11. 
 
In terms of excess profit, this solution is equivalent to the preceding one. In 
fact, note that we have calculated three factors: 
 
0.15·20 
0.1·92 
0.1·110 
 
whence the excess profit is 
 
(0.15·20+0.1·92)−0.1·110=1.2. 
 
The two last terms in the left-hand side can be grouped: 
 
0.15·20−0.1(110−92)=0.15·20−0.1·18=3−1.8=1.2. 
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Note that 3 and 1.8 are just the answers to Question (a) and Question (b) 
previously seen. So the line of argument we have here described is 
equivalent.17 
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